I argue that Quine’s naturalization of Lewis’s Kantian pragmatism should be understood in terms of Lewis’s attempt to de-psychologize pragmatist epistemology. Lewis wants epistemology to be a priori in order to be distinct from psychology. Quine’s criticisms of Lewis result in a picture that weakens the distinction between epistemology and psychology. Nevertheless, Quine’s naturalized Kantian pragmatism remains far more Kantian than is widely recognized, due to what Quine retains from Lewis.

Intentionality is one of the central problems of modern philosophy. How can a thought, action or belief be about something? Sachs draws on the work of Wilfrid Sellars, C. I. Lewis and Maurice Merleau-Ponty to build a new theory of intentionality that solves many of the problems faced by traditional conceptions. In doing so, he sheds new light on Sellars’s influential arguments concerning the ‘Myth of the Given’ and shows how we can build a productive discourse between American pragmatism, analytical (...) philosophy and European phenomenology. (shrink)

This precise provides an synopsis of my book "Intentionality and the Myths of the Given" (Routledge 2014). I describe the problem of intentionality in terms of the need to (1) do justice to both discursive intentionality (the intentionality of 'sapient' thought and talk) and somatic or bodily intentionality while also (2) avoiding the various Myths of the Given, including the epistemic and semantic Myths. I locate an early version to accomplish this project in C. I. Lewis. The argument shows why (...) Lewis's project fails and that a better account can be found in reconciling insights from Sellars and from Merleau-Ponty. (shrink)

This collection is an attempt by a diverse range of authors to reignite interest in C.I. Lewis’s work within the pragmatist and analytic traditions. Although pragmatism has enjoyed a renewed popularity in the past thirty years, some influential pragmatists have been overlooked. C. I. Lewis is arguably the most important of overlooked pragmatists and was highly influential within his own time period. The volume assembles a wide range of perspectives on the strengths and weaknesses of Lewis’s contributions to metaphysics, epistemology, (...) semantics, philosophy of science, and ethics. (shrink)

This review uses the excellent recent anthology, What Is Enough: Sufficiency, Justice, and Health, edited by Carina Fourie and Annette Rid, as a springboard for a discussion of a little-noticed problem for sufficientarian principles governing the distribution of health or health care. All sufficientarian principles must be assigned a scope: the set of individuals who are to be brought up to the level of sufficiency. When it comes to health and health care, sufficientarians will, rightly, want to reject broad scopes, (...) because they will entail that we are accountable for securing health care for, for example, wild animals. Unfortunately, any narrow scope will seem morally arbitrary, because it will imply that among all the individuals who could benefit from health care we are obligated to provide it only to some of them. But, I suggest here that such arbitrariness is no problem for narrow-scope sufficientarianism in health or health care as long as the principle is cast as a non-fundamental principle of public policy as opposed to a fundamental moral principle. (shrink)

This volume, which contains the 1962 lecture "Zeit und Sein," is the most important publication by Heidegger since Unterwegs zur Sprache appeared in 1959. Bearing the same title as the much discussed missing part of the first half of Sein und Zeit, "Zeit und Sein" is the best demonstration we have of how the later Heidegger carries out the program which was outlined in Sein und Zeit, i.e., how the clue which the analytic of Dasein provides--that Being is to be (...) understood in terms of time--is followed out in the later works. Heidegger explicates the temporality of Being in terms of its character as a "gift" and an epochal sending which "is" both as having been and as to come. Being as time is thus the "event of appropriation". In addition to "Zeit und Sein," Zur Sache des Denkens also contains: The notes of a seminar which Heidegger conducted at Todtnauberg in 1962 upon the "Zeit und Sein" lecture. As Professor Alfredo Guzzoni, the editor of these notes, indicates this is the only time that Heidegger has conducted a seminar on a text of his own composition. A lecture entitled "The End of Philosophy and the Problem of Thought," which was delivered at a Kierkegaard colloquium in 1964. An autobiographical description of Heidegger's growing interest in and attraction to Husserl's phenomenological method in the pre-Sein und Zeit period; this was prepared in 1963 for a Festschrift in honor of Hermann Niemeyer.--J. D. C. (shrink)

Ethical training in graduate programs is an important part of the professional development process. Such training has taken a position of prominence in both counseling and clinical psychology but seems to be lagging behind in the field of sport psychology. A debate exists about whether such training is necessary and, if so, how it should be provided. An important step in better understanding these issues is to identify how such training is currently taking place. This study surveyed the program directors (...) of sport psychology programs listed in the Directory of Graduate Programs in Applied Sport Psychology (Burke, Sachs, & Schrader, 2002) about the ethical training that takes place in their programs and their perceptions of the preparedness of the students in their programs. Of those contacted, 54% (n = 47) responded to the e-mail based survey. The results from these respondents indicated that 64.4% of programs require training in ethics and that the training was most commonly integrated into other nonethics courses. Overall, respondents did not feel as if students were completely prepared for either the ethical or legal issues that they will face in their professional careers. The importance of ethical training and suggestions for improving ethical training are discussed. (shrink)

Textbooks Ta‘lîm al-muta‘allim can be an alternative solution to the problems of character education in Indonesia. Inside the book there are methods that specifically leads to holistic learning code like the concept of learning objectives, choose a teacher or school, choosing friends, even mastered a learning method such as learning itself, deliberation, mutharahah, and mudzakarah. This study aimed to analyze the text book Ta‘lîm al-muta‘allim works of Sheikh Az-Zarnuji then compare it with several books of Plato’s philosophy idealism. The method (...) used is the analysis of documents by grouping clauses-clauses in the textbook Ta‘lîm al-muta‘allim in category: metaphysics, epistemology, axiology, the purpose of education, curriculum, method, the position of the students and teachers. Then compare it with documents from various sources about the Platoidealism. The study shows that there are some similarities between SheikhAz-Zarnuji thought with Plato. For example, the similarity between the two is the concept of metaphysics in Ta‘lîm al-muta‘allim called ma’rifatullah, while the concepts included in the Plato called the idealistic concept of macrocosm and microcosm. The similarity was impacted on shared educational goals from SheikhAz-Zarnuji, students and revitalize direction, into individual for himself, to achieve goodness and union with God. The difference mainly stated in the concept of metaphysics specific aspects in their respective reviews. For example, Sheikh Az-Zarnuji said that reality comes from God, while idealism states that the reality can be dug in God through contemplation or idea or reason. (shrink)

There is a strong tendency in the scholarly and sub-scholarly literature on terrorism to treat it as something like an ideology. There is an equally strong tendency to treat it as always immoral. Both tendencies go hand in hand with a considerable degree of unclarity about the meaning of the term ‘terrorism’. I shall try to dispel this unclarity and I shall argue that the first tendency is the product of confusion and that once this is understood, we can see, (...) in the light of a more definite analysis of terrorism, that the second tendency raises issues of inconsistency, and even hypocrisy. Finally, I shall make some tentative suggestions about what categories of target may be morally legitimate objects of revolutionary violence, and I shall discuss some lines of objection to my overall approach. (shrink)

From the perspectives of both an espoused core underlying value of nursing, and of public policy, the patient's voice should be central to our understanding of patient/client need, appropriate care and intervention. However, accessing and hearing the patient's voice is fraught with difficulty. Edwards reminds us that our raison d’être as nurses is human vulnerability; a vulnerability sometimes brought into sharp focus because of illness or disease. However, when people are at their most vulnerable, they are often least able to (...) identify, or indeed to express, their need – beyond the completely obvious. This paper provides a short descriptive record of one patient's experience of nursing care. This description is placed within the context of moral arguments about the nature of nursing and the impact this may have on decision‐making regarding the appropriate distribution of nursing time. One of our most acute deficits in knowledge, regarding nursing in the UK and Ireland, is a lack of knowledge of the day‐to‐day activities judgements, decisions and interventions of staff nurses at the sharp edge of patient care delivery. We also have little understanding of how, or indeed whether, staff nurses identify or articulate these activities, judgements, decisions and interventions as having a moral dimension that is rooted in respect for the needs and perceptions of the individual patient. Recent empirical work suggests that a substantial proportion of nursing time is spent in prioritizing and delegating care. We have little idea of the impact of prioritization and delegation on the quality of patient care, as perceived by the recipients of that care, our patients. It is urgent that these deficits in our knowledge and understanding are addressed. This is the case both from the perspective of providing high standards of patient care and from the point of view of linking perceptions of the moral dimension of nursing practice, organizational structure, manpower planning, nursing decisions and interventions, to patient outcomes. (shrink)

This volume contains twelve essays by friends, colleagues, and former students of Philippa Foot: Anscombe, Blackburn, Hursthouse, Kenny, Lawrence, McDowell, Quinn, Sachs, Scanlon, Michael Thompson, Wiggins, and Williams. The essays concern issues relevant to or raised by Foot's work in moral philosophy, only sometimes specifically addressing her views. Unfortunately, there is no contribution by Foot herself, either in the form of replies or a new paper. This certainly lessens the interest of the volume. Perhaps Foot was driven by modesty in (...) not wanting the focus to be on her comments, or by the need to conserve her time for larger ongoing projects. Whatever the explanation, readers would have benefited from the chance to hear her latest thinking on the issues raised in some of these papers (especially those by Blackburn and McDowell). (shrink)

Although there are many different philosophical hares that could be started by the use of the term ‘historical fact’ I am interested in pursuing one that is related to the historian's attitude to testimony. By way of preliminary, however, I should say something about my use of the word ‘fact’. A contrast that sets off my use best is probably that between fact and theory. This distinction is at once methodological and epistemological in that it concerns the structure of inquiry (...) as well as the structure of secure belief. As far as inquiry is concerned it is plausible to suppose that an investigation begins with a problem or a puzzle, the delineation of which requires certain data in the form of propositions that are known to be true, or are taken for granted or commonly agreed upon as sufficiently secure to provide a grounding for the inquiry. It is to cover such data that I am using the word ‘fact’ and hence it will not refer to just any true proposition. Theories however stand as the outcome of inquiry and involve generality and inference and classification in a way that facts do not. It is interesting that the term ‘datum’ came into use in English at the same time that the word ‘fact’, which had meant ‘a deed or action’, acquired the sort of meaning that interests me here. (shrink)

Dietrich Bonhoeffer's thinking about ethics and Christianity is a fascinating attempt to combine different, and often conflicting, strands in the Christian intellectual tradition. In this article, I outline his thinking, analyse the advantages and disadvantages in his approach, and relate it to developments in contemporary philosophy. His critique of an excessive stress upon principles and abstraction in opposition to a concern for concrete circumstances is, I argue, best seen as a necessary critique of what I call moralism rather than morality. (...) It is also related to recent philosophical theories of particularism and the debates about ‘emergency ethics’ in current philosophy. On the negative side, Bonhoeffer has a tendency to treat non-Christian ethics as necessarily relativist and at times is excessively influenced by the elements in Christian theological tradition that are hostile to the natural and to non-Christian philosophy. In addition, his invocation of ‘the Divine mandates’ seems to have undesirable implications for some genuine values in liberal democratic theory and practice. (shrink)

The analysis of philosophically important themes can depart from two different angles. The first one investigates the various answers that have been given to a certain issue, like that of the problem of knowledge, the justification of theories, the notion of culture, etcetera. These answers are often mutually contradictory which, by the way, facilitates their overview (like the schemes of rationalism-empiricism, justification-discovery, universalism-relativism). A second approach starts from the problems (or: “problematique”) behind the divergent answers (e.g., foundationalism behind both, empiricism (...) and rationalism).In the following sections the issue of discovery is discussed. Here the second line of approach has been followed, not only by making visible a same problematique, but more by trying to set out the common context of the discussion about context of discovery and context of justification. The idea is that this discussion, or better the shift taking place in that discussion, finds its reason in a context in which the distance between traditional methodology and contemporary scientific practice, also between scientific knowledge and the experience of reality has become greater. This is related to the deepening awareness of the cultural context of scientific method. Man and world, scientific method and cultural context are always interacting.From this point of view quite different philosophical approaches show nevertheless similar features pointing to new solutions. A more psychological approach to scientific method (like: Gordon's and Grmek's, even perhaps Gutting's reinterpretation of Popper) and a sociological one (e.g., Barnes, Bloor, and already Durkheim) are opposed to a more logically structured analysis of Nagel, Hempel, and also Popper. Nevertheless the view on the flexibility of scientific method defended along different lines by for instance Achinstein, Bachelard, Hesse, Piaget, Polanyi, Toulmin manifests a certain convergence in those divergent standpoints, the more so since often the cultural context of science is being stressed (e.g., Ladriére, Prigogine, Needham).The miscellany of philosophical orientations, presented in the following sections, can in this way perhaps give profile to deeper tendencies: to relate again scientific method to the context of culture and of human strategy in general. This does not blend, however, the distinction between context of justification and context of discovery. By changing their roles a new overview of this dilemma becomes possible. There is no juxtaposition of both, nor has the one to be absorbed by the other. The conclusion will be that there are still two contexts, but that one is wider, less defined and demarcated from the wider field of daily culture, and that the other is more restricted, functioning as a kind of safetydevice on behalf of the wider strategy of discovery. In such a way discovery is regarded as the wider context of the more restricted context of justification. (shrink)

The importance of this book, which appeared in the original German in 1969 under the title Zur Sache des Denkens, 743), is attested to by the rapidity with which it has been translated into English. The title of the English translation is that of the lead essay, the highly celebrated lecture which Heidegger gave in 1962 and which bears the same title as the never published "third division" of the "first half" of Being and Time. This lecture is perhaps the (...) most significant document to be added to the Heideggerian corpus since the Letter on Humanism. It is of course dramatically different from Being and Time and so cannot be regarded as a "continuation of the text of Being and Time." "Time and Being" thematizes the central notion of Heidegger’s later work, "Das Eregignis," [[sic]] translated happily by Miss Stambaugh as "Event of Appropriation". The "Event of Appropriation" is the "It" which "gives" Being and time in the sequence of epochs which constitute the history of Western metaphysics. The lecture is followed by an instructive "seminar" conducted by Heidegger on the text of "Time and Being." There is found here also a penetrating essay entitled "The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking," as well as a fascinating piece of autobiography entitled "My Way in Phenomenology." Miss Stambaugh’s translation is superb, something readers of the "Heidegger, Works" series which she edits with J. Glenn Garay have become accustomed to.—J. D. C. (shrink)

Although the concept of psychopathy retains its currency in British psychiatry, apparently being meaningful as well as useful to practitioners (1), it is often taken to refer to a purely legal category with social control functions rather than a medical diagnosis with treatment implications. I wish, in this brief article, to suggest that it is essentially, and most usefully, an ethical category which stands outside the diagnostic framework of present-day psychiatry.

This paper contains a restatement of the reflections embodied in an address to the British Society of Aesthetics on 1st March 1961, under the title ‘Some Contributions of Psychology to Aesthetics’. In the process of revision less stress has been placed on the contributions of psychology to aesthetics and more on the potential contributions of aesthetics to general psychology, and more especially to the theory of human motivation.